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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

FRANK SANT,

{

Plaintiff and Appellant,
ORLANDO

J~~;E MILLER

'

)

Defendant and Respondent. \

Appellant's

Brief
Uase No. 7277

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Utah, in and for the
County of Cache.

fTon. Marriner M. Morrison, Judge.
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Harvey A. Sjostrom,
Attorney for Appellant.
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
FRANK SANT,
Plaintiff and

Appellant's

~-ippellant,

-vs-

ORLANDO JESSE MILLER
Defendant and Respondent.

Brief
Case No. 7277

STATEMENT
This appeal is taken from a judgment of the Honorable Marriner

~{. ~Iorrison,

whereby and wherein on the

lOth day of September,--1948, he directed a verdict in
favor of the defendant, no cause of action and entering
judgment thereon ,on the lOth day of September, 1948.

PLEADINGS
The plaintiff set forth in his Amended Complaint
that on the 24th day .of January, 1947, the defendant
negligently and carelessly run plaintiff down with a
car under his control on Main Street, between Center
and First South in the city of Logan, Utah; that plaintiff
was standing on said ~fain Street about 60 or 70 feet
north of the cross-walk at First South and Main Street
waiting for a car proceeding in a southerly direction
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followed

by

defendant's

car

on

the

west

half

of said street, when defendant, while going over 30 miles
an hour, a short distance north of plaintiff (30 feetL
swerved to the left of the car proceeding him for the
purpose of passing said car and in so doing crashed into
plaintiff who was standing east of the defendant's line
of travel, prior to defendant turning to pass said proceeding car; that ~efendant was negligent in failing to
keep a proper lookout before attempting to pass the
car ahead; that he was in violation of City Ordinance
and State Statutes as to speed, and failing to slow up
when approaching an intersection; that he failed to give
any warning of his intention to pass; that plaintiff was
damaged in the sum o f$13,171.50 for personal injuries,
etc. (Tr. 20-24)
AMENDED ANSWER
The answer admits all the allegations of the complaint except the negligence and damages charged and
makes a plea of contributory negligence of the plaintiff
in the following particulars : In plaintiff negligently
failing to yield the right of way to defendant; in negligently attempting to cross· said street at a place other
than in a 1narked cross-walk; in failing to exercise reasonable care for his own safety; in failing to keep a
proper lookout for automobiles; in walking or running
directly into the path of car driven by defendant; in
leaving a place of safet~~ and going into a place of danger
and not remaining in a place of safety, or stopping,
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3
or stepping back to avoid eollision. ( Tr. 29, 30)
Defendant further filed an a1nend.Inent to his answer
alleging violation of Logan l~ity Ordinance by plaintiff

as being the proxiluate cause of his injury ( Tr. 31) which
is denied by plaintiff ('rr. 33). Defendant then filed
another an1endJnent to answer (Tr. 37) of the sa1ne
nature as the first and which was stipluated as being
denied by plaintiff ( Tr. 318).
To this Amended Answer plaintiff filed a reply
denying said contributory negligence (Tr. 34) and also
filed an Amended paragraph 5 to his amended complaint
setting out additional injuries to plaintiff and demanding damages in the sum of $25,171.50 ( Tr. 35, 36).

THE EVIDENCE
Main Street, Logan, l~tah, whereon the accident
took place was 90 feet wide from curb to curb, was
free fro1n snow, but so1newhat wet and was so well
lighted that a person could be seen for a block .or 40
rods at the time of the accident, (Tr. 215,216,217)
which was about mid-night. There are street car tracks
running north and south on the said street, the west
rail being 4 feet east of the center of the street ( Tr. 218).
After being struck Mr. Sant was lying approximately
36 feet and 8 inches east from the curb on the west side
of the street and 16 feet and 3 inches from the crosswalk on the south; the point of i1npact so far as it could
be deter1nined by the police \Vas 78 feet and 8 inches
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from the cross-walk, a difference of 62 feet and 6 inche:-~
from where impact seemed to be and point of rest of
Mr. Sant after being struck, and 1\fr. Sant was "layingright at the side just ahead of the left rear wheel of
the car'' ( Tr. 219, 220, 221, 222). The car showed in.
dentation on left side of hood and the rear view 1nirror
was broken off (Tr. 227). The evidence further shows
that Mr~ Miller by his own adn1ission at the time of the
accident ''pulled out around another car just previous
to this accident in an attempt to make the light, because
he was in a hurry''. That he ''had to get home so he
could go into Idaho the next morning early". (Tr. 235).
~hat he was going 30 miles an hour. (Tr. 235, 236).

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Errors comitted by the trial Court upon which
appellant relies for a reversal of judgment.
1. The Court erred in granting defendant's motion
for a directed verdict in favor of said defendant and
against the plaintiff and entering judgment thereon.
2. The Court erred in failing to grant plaintiff's
motion for a directed verdict in his favor and against
the defendant and to have jury assess the plaintiff's
damages.

ARGUMENT
Contributory Negligence
We assume it will not be necessary to repeat the
evidence as disclosed by the statement of fact except
as it is necessary to point out the law applicable thereto.
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The plaintiff and appellant adn1its that prior (so1ne
4 or 5 seconds) to the accident that he was crossing
in an unmarked

cross"~alk

and fro1n the east to the

west of Main Street in Logan, lTtah, at the time in
question. But by that "~e do not admit that he was
crossing and in violation of la": at the titne of the collision. The crossing had ceased and we believe he occupied the san1e legal status as one whom might have
been f.orcably placed there against his will for we do
not believe it can be said that he was crossing at the
time of said accident and therefore in violation of law.
He had ceased to w:alk 4 or 5 seconds prior to the
collision.
The question as we see it, now, is in arguing assignment of error No. 1. Whether the Court was right in
directing a verdict in favor of the defendant at the
instance or motion of opposing counsel, keeping in
mind that we must take the evidence most favorable
to the plaintiff in this case. The evidence conclusively
shows that plaintiff was standing and had been standing
where he was struck 4 or 5 second with his wife waiting
for a car just ahead of defendant and defendants to
pass, before he was struck, that defendant's car was
at least 10 feet to the \vest of \vhere plaintiff \Vas and
that he was standing not less than 36 feet 8 inches east
of the west curb and about 78 feet 8 inches north of
the cross walk at First South and "Jiain Street. In all
probability he was further east than this because he
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says he had just stepped over the west rail of the track
which is 4 feet east of the center of the street.

We assume that even though it can be said that
plaintiff was crossing, though standing, and in violation of law at the very time of the accident that counsel
will not 1naintain that without more appearing that
said violation was the proximate cause of the collision
and injury. This Court has never laid down such rule
of law to our knowledge nor has any other. To this
effect is 38 Am. Jur. pp. 899 on negligence. Also Brown
v. McCuan 132 Pac. (2) 838. This being so the Court
below could not properly direct a verdict on that ground
nor did it so do, but upon the ground .of plaintiff's failure to look and that he was in the act of stepping
forward at the time of being struck. The record is
absolutely void of any evidence showing or tending
to show that plaintiff was moving forward at the time
of collision, but is to the contrary-that he had been
standing 4 or 5 seconds waiting for defendant to pass
to the west of him as above pointed out in our statement
of the evidence.
If we are correct 1n this the .only other question
is this: Was the plaintiff guilty of cont,ributory negligence as a matter of law which was the proximate cause,
when he took his eyes off defendant's car and the car
proceeding defendant's and looked in a southwest direction for his friends for what rnust not have been over
a second of time, or n1ore likely a fraction thereof.
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for he says

'~ ,v·hile

standing there for those cars to

advance I looked to 1ny left to see 'vhere our companions
were.

N O\V anyone can tell you about as well front

there as I can.

That's "·here I \vas-just as I turned

and looked is "yhere I was struck." ( Tr. 125). It must
be remen1bered in this connection that defendant's car
was north and \Ye~t of \Yhere plaintiff and his wife
were :standing and going south. (Tr. 187). We n1ust
under the evidence accept that. If the said cars had
been straight north of hlln and coming at the said 30
miles an hour right for him he may have been guilty
of negligence by shifting his eyes to the southwest for
even a second, but this is not the case. The cars were
to the west of him. That being so can it be said he was
guilty of negligence in failing to anticipate that defendant within what must have been a very short distance
from him to suddenly and abruptly swerve to pass the
car ahead, for ~Irs. Sant testifying said, ''We stopped
in the street, and by that time they were closer (meaning
the cars) to us and there was the head car coming
rather slow, and the other car was back a short way,
and as he came up to the head car he served from
behind the car, just came out and rode the steering
wheel and came around the .other car and it was coming
rather fast, and I said 'l\1y Heavens', look out. And
I stepped back and before we knew it there was a
terrific sound.'' And as she stated she was wearing
her coat loosly around her shoulders and the car took
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

it from her person.

The coat was "jerked from me."

(Tr. 257, 258).
Mr. Sant testified that after having a meal at Dick's
Cafe which is on the east side of Main Street and slightly north of where the accident took place that he proceeded to cross Main Street in a westerly direction:
(Tr. 123, 124) that when he had just crossed the west
rail of the track he saw cars to the north and stopped
and ''while standing there for those cars to advance,
I looked to my left to see where our companions were.
Now anyone can tell you about as well from there as .I
can. That's where I was-just as I turned and looked
is where I was struck" (Tr. 125). At the time he was
struck he had his ''right arm through her left arm''
(n1eaning his wife's) (Tr. 126) and had been stopp~d
"two or three or four seconds" (Tr. 128). That when
he sa\v cars coming from the north on the west side of
the street going south the cars ''were nearer to the
west curb'' they were west of him going south and he
didn't see ''any cars in the center of the street or along
the track at all. No cars were heading for him but were
towards the west curb. (Tr. 187) And there were no
cars parked at the west curb at the place of accident.
(Tr. 190)
Mrs. Sant, wife of plaintiff, testified that she saw
cars coming from the north and as the cars approached
she and Mr. Sant stopped, her left arm through his
right arm and that ''We stopped in the street, and by
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that time they 'Yere closer to us and there was-the
head car

"~as

coining rather slow, the other car was

back a short 'vay::;, and as he came up to the head car he
s\verved fron1 behind the car, just can1e out and rode the
steering \\""heel and crune around the car, and it was
coining rather fast and I said ·'illy Heavens! look out!''
and I stepped back and before 'Ye knew it there was a
terrific ~ound.' · That she \Yas wearing her coat loosely
around her shoulders and the car took the coat from
her. ( Tr. 257, 238) And testifying further she stated:
~~We were standing here and the cars were coming
about so-style. We'll say just a little-is this West'1
~'Q.

Yes."

A. '~About like this coming up, and this car was
coming slow. Mr. nfiller came up here and swerved
and came out here, and here we stood. And I stepped
back like this and evidently l\Ir. Sant did not and it hit
him." (Tr. 259, ~60) That before her husband was
~truck they had been waiting in the road "3 .or 4 or 5
seconds, hard to determine'' ( Tr. 272).
From this evidence it is apparent that Mr. Miller as
he overtook the car ahead he swerved to the left a short
distance from where plaintiff and his wife were standing waiting for the cars to pass. That Mr. Sant was
struck by defendant, coming fron1 the north, just as he
turned and looked in a south\vesterly direction; that
.:VI rs. Sant saw the dPfendant as he ~''rerved to the left
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of the car ahead to pass and that defendant's car caught
~lrs.

Sant's coat as she stepped back to avoid being

struck. Mr. Miller testified that he did not swerve, but
drove straight ahead which was in contradiction to what
he told police officer Austin Frank at the time of the
accident. (Tr. 235) He, Miller, further testified he did
not see the Sants until he struck Mr. Sant. (Tr. 287)
That Mr. Sant was greatly injured and damaged
by said accident is proven by the evidence beyond all
question and we do not believe counsel will dispute it
so we pass the details by. ( Tr. 191, 192)
That we must take the evidence most favorable to
the appellant in this case is settled law:
Barlow v. Utah Light and Traction Co.
77 Utah 556, 298 P. 386.
Ricks v. Budge 91 Utah 307, 64 P. (2) 208
1Iiller v. White 70 Utah 145-258 P. 565.
Roach v. Railroad Co., 69 Utah, 530 256 P. 1061.
Uhr v. Eaten, 95 Utah, 309, 80 P. (2) 925.
Graham v. Johnson, et al 166 P. (2) 230.
After all the evidence was in the defendant made
a motion for a directed verdict in his favor on the
ground that plaintiff's own ~vidence showed contributory negligence on his part which was granted, (Tr. 312,
315, 87) and gave defendant judgment on the verdict.
(Tr. 88)
In ~esponse to the judge's request that Mr. Steed
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sign the verdict,

~f r.

Steed said:

~~Yes,

I'll sign it. I• ve

got to, but it's against 1ny 'vishes. ''
In his direction to the jury to find for the defendant
and against the plaintiff the judge recites that the testimony of ~lr. Sant · ~,vith respect to the injury to his left
leg \Ya~ the effect that he probably was just taking a
step when the car hit his right leg.'' ( Tr. 315) No such
testin1ony "\vas given and the record does not show it
which was called to the judge's attention at the con·
elusion of his remarks, but to no avail.
The Court held that plaintiff did not keep a proper
lookout and he was apparently taking a step forward at
time of being struck and therefore was guilty of contributory negligence as a 1natter of law, and directed a
verdict of no cause of action. (Tr. 315)
The plaintiff, too, made a motion for a directed
verdict and that the only question to be left to the jury
was one of damages. This was denied. (Tr. 313)
In Section 1450 Blashfield on automobile law it is
stated that a pedestrian crossing between intersections
and in violation of the ordinance is not guilty of negligence by failing to anticipate the action of a motorist
in suddenly changing his course and running him down.
To the same effect is 87 Atlantic 339, 109 Atlantic 608.
This is in line with 38 An1. Jur. pp 871 Sec. 191, which
reads in part, ''ordinarily his failure to anticipate negligence does not constitute negligence on his part and
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will not defeat an action by him for the injuries sustained". To the same effect is l\'lcCulloch v. Horton 56
Pac. (2) 1344.
Moreno v. Los Angeles Transfer Co. 186 P. 800.
Another question that might be put is this: Wa~
the plaintiff negligent in momentarily, which must not
have been a second's time, taking his eyes off the cars
to the north and west of hirn going south~ We think
not. . Here plaintiff had no reason to, nor would a
prudent person under all circumstances, believe that
defendant would suddenly change his course and run
him down. To this effect is Dicks v. Wilson, 56 P. (2)
1036. Michel v. Rosenfield 255 P .. 760. 38 Am. Jur.
pp. 867 sec 190 and same volume pp. 860 sec 184. In
the case of Western and A. R. Co. v. Ferguson 39 S. E.
54, the Court said that the duty imposed by law upon
all persons to exercise ordinary care to avoid the consequences of another's negligence does not arise until
the negligence of such other is existing, and is either
apparent or the circumstances are such that an o.rdinary
prudent person would have reason to apprehend its
existance. And in Walker v. St. Paul City R. Company,
84 N. W. 222 th~ Court held that one who is called upon
to exercise care to a void danger from the acts of others
may, in regulating his own conduct, have regard to the
probable or apprehended conduct of such persons and
to the presumption that they will act with reasonabh~
caution, and not with. culpable negligence.
~
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There is also the further fact in this case that
:Jlns. Sant '"·as looking at the actual time that defendant
suddenly

s,,~erved

to the left of the proceeding car and

gaYe ilnn1ediate outcry to ""look out".
said that at the tin1e

~lr.

Can it not be

8ant turned his head to the

south,vest his wife was his lookout and he could rely
upon her to give ample warning if any danger appeared
from the north. VVT e think so.
We assmne that defendant's counsel will not take
the position that defendant was not guilty of negligence
which was the proxin1ate cause of the collision and
injury complained of, for the record is replete from
defendent's own testimony to that effect. For Mr.
~filler testified, as stated before tha~ he did not see
the Sants until he struck ~Ir. Sant (Tr. 278) and did not
even attempt to explain this away. And this Court
has held upon numerous appeals that a driver of a
car is held to see what is in plain sight and could have
seen if he had looked. And California together with
all other Courts have followed this common sense rule.
The Supreme Court of California said in the case of
Johnson v. J-ohnson 31 P. (2) 237 that it is· a part of
the duty of the operator of a motor vehicle to keep
his rnachine always under control, so as to avoid collision with other cars and other persons using the highway. He has no right to assume that the road is clear~
but under all circurnstances and al all times he must
be vigilent and must anticipate and expect the presence
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of others.

Accordingly the fact that he did not know

that anyone was on the highway, is no excuse for the
conduct, which would have amounted to recklessness, if
he had known that another vehicle or person was on
the highway.

And as has heretofore been pointed out

an object such as a rnan, could have been seen a block
away at the time of the accident.
CONCLUSION
Under the facts, circumstances and law, the Court
below could not say that plaintiff was guilty as a matter
of law of contributory negligence proximately causing
said accident and injuries and that question of contributory negligence should have gone to the jury together
with the other issues of the case. To say the least, the
issue of contributory negligence of plaintiff was one
for the jury, and we feel that the Court invaded the
province of the jury as reasonable men might differ
as to such alleged contributory negligence and if that
be so, this Court has held in many cases where such
is the case, it is a case that must be submitted to the
JUry. We believe that no cases need be cited to this
Court to sustain such view.
We further believe -that the Court should have
directed a verdict for the plaintiff, on the argurnent
here used on our first assignrnent of error and will not
repeat except to add this: Defendant 'vas duty bound
to see plaintiff in the street and to have avoided hin1
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taking as true defendant's o'vn testi1nony, and we believe
the fore1nan of the jury was right when he said, ''Yes,
I'll sign it, I've got to, but it's against my wishes." (Tr.
316).
"\V. e respectfully request that the decision~MJ~rl judg-

ment be reversed and a new trial granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Harvey A. Sjostrom,
Attorney for Appellant.
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